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Abstract 
 
The weighted value was introduced by Shapley in 1953 as an asymmetric version of his value. 
Since then several axiomatizations have been proposed including one by Shapley in 1981 
specifically addressed to cost allocation, a context in which weights appear naturally. It was at 
the occasion of a comment in which he only stated the axioms. The present paper offers a 
proof of Shapley's statement as well as an alternative set of axioms. It is shown that the value 
is  the  unique  rule  that  allocates  additional  fixed  costs  fairly:  only  the  players  who  are 
concerned contribute to the fixed cost and they contribute in proportion to their weights. A 
particular attention is given to the case where some players are assigned a zero weight.  
 
 
JEL Classification: C71, D46 
Keywords: cost allocation, Shapley value, fixed cost 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This  is  a  revised  version  of  CORE  Discussion  Paper  2009-35.  The  author  is  grateful  to  Filippo 
Calciano, Francois Maniquet, Isabelle Maret, Jean-François Mertens, Sylvie Thoron, René van den 
Brink, Séverine Vanden Eynde and two anonymous referees for useful comments and suggestions on 
earlier versions.  
_______________________ 
* CORE, University of Louvain, Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.  
 Tel: 0032-10-472934. Fax: 0032-10-474301. Email: pierre.dehez@uclouvain.be    1 
1. Introduction 
There is a large literature on cost allocation based on solutions to cooperative games with 
transferable  utility.
1  Among  the solutions  that  have been used in actual cost  allocation 
problems,  the  Shapley  value  is  definitely  predominant.  The  value  was  introduced  and 
axiomatized by Shapley (1953a and b), and its use in cost allocation was suggested by Shubik 
(1962). Since then a number of alternative axiomatizations have been proposed among which 
Young (1985a), Chun (1989) and van den Brink (2001). Shapley (1953a) also considered an 
asymmetric  version  of  the  value  obtained  by  introducing  exogenous  weights  to  cover 
asymmetries that are not included in the underlying game. This "weighted" value has been 
studied by Owen (1968, 1972) and its computation has been considered by Dragan (2008). It 
has been axiomatized by Kalai and Samet (1987), Hart and Mas-Colell (1987), and Weber 
(1988).
2 In the meantime, at the occasion of a comment at an accounting conference, Shapley 
(1981) had suggested an axiomatization of his weighted value within the specific framework 
of cost allocation.  
The aim of the present paper is to complete and extend Shapley's  1981 note by addressing 
explicitly the question of the allocation of fixed costs . We offer in this way a set of axioms 
that further supports the use of the weighted Shapley value in cost allocation.  
In the symmetric case, weights are equal and fairness suggests that any additional fixed cost 
(e.g. the cost of a common facility) should be allocated uniformly among the players who are 
concerned. This is what the Shapley value does while examples indicate that other solution 
concepts like the nucleolus generally do not. Actually, we show that the Shapley value is the 
only allocation rule that allocates additional fixed cost uniformly.  
In the asymmetric case, weights are assigned to players and fixed costs are divided according 
to these weights. The resulting cost allocation corresponds to the allocation derived from the 
standard formula applied to the dual game and not to the associated surplus sharing game.  
Weights  come up naturally in  the context  of cost  allocation. Shapley illustrates his  1981 
comment with the well known problem of dividing the travel costs of a scientist who visits a  
series of institutions. There the weights are the number of days spent in each  institution. 
Weights are also included in contracts signed by the owners of a condominium and used to 
divide the cost of building or maintaining common facilities. Another example is data or 
patent pooling among firms where the size of the firms, measured for instance by their market 
                                                 
1 See for instance Roth and Verrecchia (1979), Moulin (1988 and 2003) or Young (1985b).  
2 Kalai and Samet allow for zer o weights. Hart and Mas -Colell base their characterization on their p otential 
function. Weber defines the weighted value as a particular random order value.    2 
shares, are natural weights.
3 The case where a player is assigned a zero weight is of particular 
interest. For instance, in a data sharing framework, a player may hold data and be willing to 
share them while not being otherwise part of the cooperative project.  
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 is devoted to the definition of  weighted cost 
games and related concepts, in particular   the  marginal cost vectors and  the  probability 
distributions  over players' permutations  associated to  given  (positive)  weights. Following 
Weber (1988), the weighted Shapley value is defined in Section 3 as a random order value 
where  the  relative  weight  of  a  player  is  the  probability  of  being  first  in  a  players' 
permutation.
4 We give a proof of Shapley's 1981 proposition and provide an alternative set of 
axioms  that  are then  compared  to  the  axioms  proposed by van den Brink (2001)   in the 
symmetric case. The case where some players are assigned a zero weight is considered apart. 
We show that to compute the weighted value, nonzero-weight players and zero-weight players 
can be treated separately. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 4.   
2. Cost games 
2.1  Weighted cost games 
A set  {1,..., }of players, 2, N n n   face the problem of dividing the cost of some facility. 
The cost of realizing it to the benefit of any coalition S  N is also known. This defines a real-
valued set function C on the subsets of N. Any set function C such that  ( ) 0 C   defines a 
cost function. The dual of a set function C on N is defined by  *( ) ( ) ( \ ). C S C N C N S   For 
any given player set N, the restriction  T C of a set function C on a subset  TN   is simply 
defined by  ( ) ( ). T C S C S T   
Linear  combinations  of  cost  functions  on  a  common  set  N  are  cost  functions  on  N. 
Consequently the space of all cost functions on a set N is a vector space that can be identified 
to 
21
n  where 2
n–1 is the number of nonempty coalitions. The collection of 2
n–1 unanimity 
games  
 
( ) 1 if
0 if not
T u S T S 

 
defined for all T  N, T ≠ , forms a basis of 
21 .
n    
 
 
                                                 
3 See Dehez and Tellone (2011) for an analysis of the resulting "data games".   
4 This is in contrast with the standard weighted Shapley value where the relative weight of a player is the 
probability of being last in a players' permutation.    3 
Here we shall use the alternative basis formed by the duals of the unanimity games: 
 
( ) 1 if
0 if not
T e S S T    

 
defined for all  ,. T N T    Unanimity games were introduced by Shapley in 1953 to prove 
existence and uniqueness of the value. The duals of unanimity games are the representation 
games introduced by Kalai and Samet (1987).
5  
Any cost function C on a set N can be uniquely decomposed into a linear combination of 
representation games i.e. there exists a unique vector  () T    that defines C in the basis 
( ): T e   
 
:
( ) ( ) T T T
T N T T S
T
C S e S 
  

    (1) 
The coefficients  T   are given by: 
 
1
:
( 1) ( )
t s n
T
S S T N
CS 
  

    (2) 
A cost function C on a set N is subadditive if: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) S T C S T C S C T        
From now on, we assume that cost functions are subadditive. Consequently, the set  () GN of 
cost functions on a given set N is a convex cone in 
21 .
n   A cost function is concave if  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) for all , C S T C S T C S C T S T N        
Concave cost function are subadditive and the set of concave cost function is itself a convex 
cone. Alternatively a cost function is concave if marginal costs are nonincreasing with respect 
to set inclusion:  
     ( ) ( \ ) ( ) ( \ ) i S T C S C S i C T C T i        
Example 1  Consider the 3-player cost function defined by: 
 
(1) 6 (12) 9
(2) 7 (13) 13
(3) 10 (23) 15 (123) 16
CC
CC
C C C


  
  
                                                 
5 Representation games can be seen as normalized fixed cost games: coalitions containing members of T entail a 
fixed cost equal to 1.    4 
It is concave and thereby subadditive. The coefficients  ' T s  are given by: 
 
1 12
2 13
3 23 123
12
31
7 0 2


  


  
 
For  a  given  a  player  set  N,  we  denote  by  1 ( ,..., ) n w w w    the  vector  of  weights  that  are 
assigned to players, with  0for all . i wi   The extension to situations where some players are 
assigned a zero weight will be considered in Section 35. The symmetric case is defined by 
equal weights.   
A triple ( , , ) NCw defines a weighted cost game. A rule is a mapping  that associates to any 
weighted cost game ( , , ) NCw a n-dimensional vector  ( , , ). y N C w     
Notations: Lower case letters n, s, t,… denote the sizes of the sets N, S, T,… For any vector y, 
( | ) Si y y i S   is the subvector corresponding to  a subset S and  ( ) . i iS y S y
   Specific 
coalitions may be identified as ijk… instead of { , , ,...}. i j k  For a coalition S,  \ Si  denotes the 
subset from which player i has been removed.  
2.2  Fixed costs 
Starting from a cost function  () C G N   and a nonempty coalition TN  , a fixed cost is an 
additional amount f  that only affects coalitions including members of T :
 6  
 
( ) ( ) for all such that
( ) otherwise
C S C S f S N S T
CS
      

  (3) 
Put differently, the cost function C is defined by  . T C C f e    
Example 2  Airport  games  are  defined  by  nonnegative  vectors  1 ( ,..., ) n c c c    such  that 
12 ... . n c c c     The associated cost function is given by C(S) = MaxiS ci. Airport games are 
concave. Setting c0 = 0, we observe that the additional cost ci – ci-1 is a fixed cost for the 
players in Ti = {i,…,n}.
7 
We denote by  ( , ) Nf the fixed cost game corresponding to a facility whose cost is fixed and 
equal to f. The corresponding cost function C is defined by  N C f e   i.e.  () C S f   for all 
,. S N S     The dual of the fixed cost game ( , ) Nf is a pure bargaining game:   
  ( ) for all *( ) 0 for all and *( ) C S f S N C S S N C N f         
                                                 
6 Costs as well as fixed costs can be negative. A fixed cost can alternatively be interpreted as a tax when positive 
and a subsidy (or bonus) when negative.  
7 See Littlechild and Owen (1973) or, more recently, Thomson (2007).     5 
2.3  Marginal cost vectors 
For a given a set of players N, we denote by  N   the set of the  ! n  players' permutations. The 
vector of marginal costs  ( , ) t N C
  associated to a cost function  () C G N   and a permutation 
1 ( ,..., ) n ii    is defined by:   
 
1 11
1 1 1
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( , ) ( ,..., ) ( ,..., ) ( 2,..., )
k
i
i k k
t N C C i C C i
t N C C i i C i i k n



   
  
 
Marginal cost vectors are imputations i.e. individually rational allocations:  
  for all , ( , ) ( ) and ( , ) ( ) for all N i i
iN
t N C C N t N C C i i N
 

       
Furthermore 
 
1
( , *) ( , ) t N C t N C


   (4) 
where 
1
1 ( ,..., ) n ii 
   denotes the reversed permutation. The marginal cost vectors associated 
to the fixed cost game ( , ) Nf are given by: 
 
( , ) if is first in
0 otherwise
i t N f f i   

 
For a given a set of players N, we denote by  () N   the set of probability distributions over 
the set permutations  . N   Let us assume for a moment that the wi's are natural numbers. If 
there  were  wi  players  of  type i,  the  probability  () w P    that  the  permutation  1 ( ,..., ) n ii    
comes out through a sequence of independent drawings is given by:  
 
1 12
1 2 1 1
( ) ...
... ...
nk
n n n n j
n
ii ii
w n
k i i i i i i i jk
ww ww
P
w w w w w w w


 


     

  (5) 
knowing that, each time a player is drawn, all players of the same type are removed.  In the 
symmetric  case,  the wi's  are  all  equal  and  ( ) 1/ ! for all . wN Pn      For  normalized 
weights,  ( ) 1 wN    and  wi  is  then the probability that player  i comes  first in  an arbitrary 
permutation:  
 
\\
\ ( , ) ( )
i
N i N i
w i w w i P i w P w


 
   
Players i and j are substitutes in a cost game  ( , , ) NCw if they have identical weights and 
identical marginal costs:  and ( ) ( \ ) ( ) ( \ ) ij w w C S C S i C S C S j      for all S containing i 
and j. A player i is a dummy in a cost game ( , , ) NCw if his or her marginal costs are all zero: 
( ) ( \ ) 0 for all . C S C S i S N       6 
3. The Shapley value 
3.1  The weighted value as a random order value 
A random order value is the mean marginal cost vector corresponding to some probability 
distribution  ( ). N    Hence, the set of allocations corresponding to random order values is 
the convex hull of the marginal cost vectors, a set known as the Weber set. It contains the 
core.
8  The  (dual)  weighted value  of a cost game  ( , , ) NCw  is  the  random  order  value 
associated to the probability distribution induced by w:  
  ( , , ) ( ) ( , )
N
w N C w P t N C

 

    (6) 
3.2 Shapley's characterization 
Shapley (1981) proposed to characterize the weighted value in a cost allocation context by the 
following set of axioms:   
A1  Full cost allocation (efficiency) 
    For all  ,   and  : ( , , ) ( )
n
i
iN
N C G N w N C w C N  

     
A2  Symmetry 
 
If, for some  ,   ( ) and     and   are substitute players: 
( , , ) ( , , ) 
n
ij
N C G N w i j
N C w N C w 
 

 
A3  Dummy elimination 
  \\
\
If for some  ,    ( ) and  ,   is a null player:
( , , ) 0 and ( , , ) ( \ , , )  for all 
where ( \ ) denotes the restriction of   to  \ .
n
i j j N i N i
Ni
N C G N w i
N C w N C w N i C w j i
C G N i C N i
  
 
  

 
A4  Homogeneity 
 
0  is homogeneous of degree   in  :
for all  ,   ( ), and > 0,  ( , , ) ( , , )
n
w
N C G N w N C w N C w

       
 
A5  Additivity   
    12
1 2 1 2
For all  ,  ,  and  :
( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )
n N C C G N w
N C C w N C w N C w   
 
  
 
                                                 
8 See Weber (1988).     7 
A6  Shared facility 
 
For all  , and :
( ) 1 ( , , ) for all
n
ii
N w f
w N N f w w f i N 
 
   
 
These are standard axioms except for the dummy player axiom that is stronger than usual, and 
for the fixed cost axiom that applies specifically to cost allocation problems. The dummy 
player axiom says that a dummy player does not contribute and that removing a dummy 
player does not affect what the other players pay.
9  
The fixed cost axiom provides a natural interpretation of the (normalized) weights: they are 
the proportions into which a fixed cost is to be divided and they coincide with the probability 
of being first in a players' permutation.
10  
Shapley takes the opportunity of his comment to insist on the implicit requir ement that an 
allocation method  should  only  depend on  N,  C  (and  w),  a  "hidden  axiom"  that  makes 
additivity a natural requirement in a transferable utility framework: "It is the hidden "domain" 
axiom, not the additivity axiom, that demands that we shut our eyes to the structural detail 
that stands behind the characteristic function." (1981, p.132) 
11  
Lemma   The weighted value as defined by (6) satisfies the axioms A1 to A6.  
Proof  Consider a  cost  game  ( , , ). NCw  Since  marginal  cost  vectors are  imputations,  A1 
immediately follows.  
Assume i and j are substitute players and consider an arbitrary permutation  . N    Then the 
permutation obtained from   by exchanging i and j has the same probability of occurrence 
than . A2 then follows since the amount player i is asked to pay if  occurs is equal to the 
amount player j is asked to pay if  occurs.  
Homogeneity of the probability distributions  w P  implies A4. A5 and the first part of A3 are 
immediate consequences of (6).  
The second part of A3 requires some attention. Using (5) we observe that removing a player, 
say j, results in the probability distribution over  \ Nj   given by:  
                                                 
9 This part of the axiom is the "null player out" axiom introduced by Derks and Haller (1999).  
10 In Shapley's words: "The weights represent the proportions into which we want to divide the total cost in a 
situation where there is a single jointly-used facility that costs a fixed amount K, regardless of the number of 
users." (1981, p.135) 
11 Ignoring this hidden axiom is a common source of misunderstanding.  Shapley refers in  particular to the 
critique of the additivity axiom made by Luce and Raiffa (1957, p.248).    8 
 
\
\
( ) ( )
Nj
N
Nj
ww PP




 
     (7) 
If j is a dummy, we have:  
  ( ) ( \ ) ( \ ) ( \ ) for all C S C S i C S j C S ij S N       (8) 
Combining (7) and (8), we then get: 
 
\
'
'
( ) ( , ) ( ) ( \ , ) for all \
j
N N j
w i w i P t N C P t N j C i N j




 
    
It  remains  to  verify A6.  We  have  already  observed  that,  in  the  marginal  cost  vectors  
associated to a fixed cost game ( , ), Nf  only players who are first pay and they pay exactly f.  
Since  the  probability  that  player  i  comes  first  in  an  arbitrary  permutation  is  given  by 
ij j ww   A6 follows.   
Shapley suggests using the duality relation but he provides no proof that his axioms define 
uniquely (6). It happens that efficiency and symmetry are actually redundant.  
Theorem 1  The weighted Shapley value is the unique allocation rule that satisfies dummy 
elimination (A3), homogeneity (A4), additivity (A5) and shared facility (A6).  
Proof   We start from a game  ( , , ) NCw and the unique representation of C in the basis () T e  
given by (1). Consider some coalition  . TN   Players outside T are dummies in the game 
( , , ). TT N e w   Hence, by A3:   
  ( , , ) 0 for all \ i T T N e w i N T    
and we may restrict ourselves to the game defined on T. A4 allows using normalized weights 
/ ( ). ii w w w T   Applying A6, we then have:  
  ( , , ) ( , , ) for all i T T i T T T i T N e w T e w w i T        
Using A5, we may then extend   to the entire game ( , , ): NCw  
12  
  1 ( , , ) ( , , ) ( ... )
()
i
i i T T T
T N T N
T T i
w
N C w N e w i n
wT
   

 
      (9) 
Hence  A3,  A4,  A5  and  A6  define  a  unique  allocation  rule .  By  the  Lemma, it  is  the  rule 
defined by (6).     
From the proof, it is easily seen that keeping efficiency, only the null player out part of A3 is 
needed. 
                                                 
12 Any function v can be written as v = (v – u) + u. If v, u and v – u are all subadditive functions, additivity can be 
applied to deal with negative coefficients.    9 
Applying (9) to Example 1, the weighted value associated to the weights w = (1, 2, 3) is given 
by (2.25, 5, 8.75) to be compared to the symmetric value (3.17, 4.67, 8.17). This is confirmed 
by the following table that, according to (4), lists the marginal cost vectors and probability 
distributions associated to the game ( , , ) NCw and its dual ( , *, ). N C w   
 
  1  2  3  Pw  1  2  3  Pw* 
123  6  3  7  1/15  1  5  10  1/3 
132  6  3  7  1/10  1  7  8  1/4 
213  2  7  7  1/12  3  3  10  1/6 
231  1  7  8  1/4  6  3  7  1/10 
312  3  3  10  1/6  2  7  7  1/12 
321  1  5  10  1/3  6  3  7  1/15 
3.3  Alternative characterization 
Consider the game ( , , ) T N C f e w   defined by (3) where a fixed cost f concerns some subset 
T  N of players. Fairness suggests that only players concerned should  contribute to the fixed 
cost: 
A7  Fairness 
13  
 
For all  ,    ( ), , and :
( , , ) ( , , )  for all  \
n
i T i
N C G N w f T N
N C f e w N C w i N T 
    
  
 
Furthermore, they should contribute in proportion to their weights:   
A8  Shared additional facility 
 
For all  ,    ( ), , and , there exists such that
( , , ) ( , , ) for all 
n
i T i i
N C G N w f T N b
N C f e w N C w wb i T 
     
   
   
Together the axioms A7 and A8 replace additivity. It is easily verified that (6) satisfies A7 
and A8. The following proposition establishes that, together with A1, A7, and A8 define 
uniquely the weighted value.  
Theorem 2  The weighted value is the unique allocation rule that satisfies efficiency (A1), 
fairness (A7) and shared additional facility (A8).   
                                                 
13 This axiom is implied by Young's monotonicity axiom: if a game changes so that a player's contribution to all 
coalitions does not decrease then that player's allocation does not decrease. See Young (1985a).    10 
Proof  Consider a game  ( , , ), NCw  a fixed cost f and an arbitrary subset  . TN   Using A7 
and A8, we get: 
 
( ,0 , ) ( ,0, ) for all \
( ,0 , ) ( ,0, ) for all
i T i
i T i i
N f e w N w i N T
N f e w N w wb i T


  
   
 
Summing over N and using A1, we obtain  / ( ). b f w T   As a consequence,  
 
\\
( , , ) 0 ( ,0, ) 0 i T i
i N T i N T
N f e w N w 

     
Applying this argument to  \ T N i   for an arbitrary  , iN   we conclude that  ( ,0, ) 0 i Nw    
for all . iN   Hence, applied to the unique representation of C in the basis () T e  given by (1), 
we have: 
 
( , , ) 0 for all \
( , , ) for all
()
i T T
i
i T T T
N e w i N T
w
N e w i T
wT

  


 
Applying A7 repeatedly to every subset T  N, S ≠ ,  is then extended to the entire game 
(N,C,w) as in (9).   
The following observations confirm the logical independence of the axioms A1, A7 and A8. 
The proportional division  
  ( , , ) ( )
()
i
i
w
N C w C N
wN
   
satisfies A1 and A8 but not A7. The symmetric Shapley value satisfies A1, A7 but not A8. 
Multiplying the sum of marginal costs of any given player by his or her weight defines a rule 
    ( , , ) ( ) ( \ ) ii
SN
Si
N C w w C S C S i 


   
that satisfies A7 and A8 but not A1.  Indeed 
      ( , , ) ( ) ( \ ) ( ) ( \ ) i T i i T T
S N S N
S i S i
N C fe w w C S C S i w f e S e S i 


       
where  
 
: ( ) ( \ ) 0 0 0 if
1 1 0 if
: ( ) ( \ ) 1 0 1 if {}
1 1 0 if {}
TT
TT
i T e S e S i S T
ST
i T e S e S i S T i
S T i
       
     
      
    
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Hence A7 is satisfied. So is A8 because the number of coalition S including a given player i 
and whose intersection with a given T  reduces to {i} is a positive constant independent of i.  
To illustrate how the axioms A1, A7 and A8 determine a unique solution, consider the airport 
game defined in Example 2. Knowing that ci – ci-1 is a fixed cost for the players in Ti = 
{i,…,n}, we obtain the following allocation:   
  
1
11
1
22
2 1 2 1
12
1 2 1 1
12
1 2 1 1 2 1
1 2 1
...
()
... ...
...
( ) ... ( ) 3,..., 1
... ... ...
...
( ) ... ( ) ( )
... ...
n
nn
k k k
k k k
n n k n
n n n
n n n n n
n n n n
w
yc
ww
ww
y c c c
w w w w
w w w
y c c c c c k n
w w w w w w
w w w
y c c c c c c c
w w w w w w

  



  
   
       
     
       
    
 
This is exactly the cost allocation derived from (6).  
3.4  Equal weights 
In the symmetric case, weights are equal and the axioms A1, A7 and A8 become:  
A1'  Full cost allocation (efficiency) 
    For all  ,  : ( , ) ( ) i
iN
N C G N N C C N 

   
A7'  Fairness 
  For all  ,    ( ), and :   ( , ) ( , )  for all  \ i T i N C G N f T N N C f e N C i N T         
A8'  Shared additional facility 
 
For all  ,    ( ), and , there exists such that
( , ) ( , ) for all  i T i
N C G N f T N b
N C f e N C b i T 
   
   
 
By  Theorem  2,  the  (symmetric)  Shapley  value  is  uniquely  defined  by  A1',  A7'  and  A8'. 
Actually, Shared additional facility can be replaced by Symmetry.
14 
A2'  Symmetry:  
  If,for some  ,   ( ),   and   are substitute players:  ( , ) ( , )  ij N C G N i j N C N C    
                                                 
14 Thanks are due to René van den Brink for suggesting this proposition.    12 
Theorem 3  The symmetric value is the unique allocation rule that satisfies efficiency (A1'), 
symmetry (A2'), and fairness (A7').  
Proof  Consider a symmetric cost game  ( , ). NC  By A1' and A2',  ( ,0) 0for all . i N i N    
Given the unique representation of  C in the basis (eT) given by (1), A2' implies that there 
exist  and in ab  such that:  
 
( , ) for all \
for all
i T T N e a i N T
b i T
 

 
where  0 a   by A7' and  / T bt    by A1'.  Applying fairness repeatedly to all subsets T  N,  
 is then extended to the entire game ( , ) NC as in (9).    
The axioms A7 and A8 must be compared to the fairness axiom introduced by van den Brink 
(2001) to characterize the Shapley value:  
Consider  two  games  (N,v)  and  (N,w),  and  a  subset  T  N  of  players  who  are 
substitute in (N,w). There exists  a such that  ( , ) ( , , ) ii N v w N C v a      for 
all i  T  i.e. the change in the allocation is the same for all substitute players.  
Applied  to  the  allocation  of  an  additional  fixed  cost,  van  den  Brink's  axiom  implies  the 
following property:  
 
For all  ,    ( ), and , there exists , such that:
( , ) ( , )   for all  \
( , ) ( , )   for all 
i T i
i T i
N C G N f T N a b
N C f e N C a i N T
N C f e N C b i T


   
   
   
 
The dummy player axiom is however needed to characterize the Shapley value. Indeed, a = 0 
and the above combination of A7 and A8 holds.  
The nucleolus is another game theoretic solution concept that has been used in cost allocation 
problems.
15 To illustrate how the nucleolus allocates fixed costs in a symmetric situation, as 
compared to the Shapley value, consider Example  1. The cost allocations derived from the 
Shapley  value  and  the  nucleolus  are  given  by   (3.17, 4.67,8.17)  and  (2.75, 4.75,8.5) 
respectively. Adding a fixed cost  3 f   affecting all  players, the cost allocations become 
(4.17,5.67,9.17) and  (3.67,5.67,9.17)  respectively: the  Shapley  value imposes  to  each 
player  the  same  additional  contribution  while  the  nucleolus  imposes  different  additional 
contributions.  
                                                 
15  The  nucleolus  has  been  introduced  by  Schmeidler  (1967).  It  selects  a  core  allocation  when  the  core  is 
nonempty and defines an allocation rule that satisfies efficiency, symmetry, dummy player but not additivity.    13 
Example 3  Consider the 4-player cost function defined by: 
  C(1) = 7, C(2) = 9, C(3) = 13, C(4) = 15  
  C(12) = 15, C(13) = 19, C(14) = 21, C(23) = 20, C(24) = 22, C(34) = 25 
  C(123) = 27, C(124) = 26, C(134) = 24, C(234) = 26, C(1234) = 30 
The cost allocations derived from the Shapley value and the nucleolus are respectively given 
by (5.08, 6.75, 8.58, 9.58) and (5.5, 7.5, 8.25, 8.75). Adding a fixed cost f = 2 that affects 
players 1 and 2, the cost allocations then become respectively (6.08, 7.75, 8.58, 9.58) and 
(63.3, 83.3, 85, 88.3): the fixed cost is divided equally between player 1 and 2 by the Shapley 
value while the nucleolus imposes additional contributions to all four players.  
3.5  Zero weights 
So far we have considered the case where weights were positive. In some applications it may 
be justified to assign a zero-weight to some players. For instance, in a data sharing process 
some players may hold data and be willing to share them while not being otherwise part of the 
cooperative project. Furthermore, to generate the set of all weighted values, it is necessary to 
extend the definition of the value to the case where some weights are zero. This has been done 
by Kalai and Samet (1987).  
The set of weighted Shapley values is a subset of the Weber set
16 and, surprisingly, the core 
happens to be a subset of the set of weighted values . This was  shown by Monderer, Samet 
and Shapley (1992)  who  also prove  that a cost game is concave  if  and  only  if  its  core 
coincides with the set of weighted values. Consequently, the three sets coincide on the class of 
concave cost games: the core, the set of weighted values and the Weber set.  
Here  we  are  interested  in  further  characterizing  weighted  values  when  some  players  are 
assigned a zero weight. We shall see that what nonzero-weight players pay coincides with the 
weighted value of the cost game restricted to the set of nonzero-weight player. The question 
then concerns the allocation of what remains among zero-weight players.  
For a vector of weights  ,
n w    the probability that a given permutation  = (i1,…,in) occurs 
is given by (5). It can alternatively be written as:  
 
1
1
1
1
()
1/
jk
n
w n
k ii jk
P
ww





 

  (10) 
                                                 
16 See Weber (1988) and Vasiliev (2007).    14 
For a given set N of players with weights  ,
n w    the set of all random order values is 
obtained from probability distributions in the set  
    ( ) ( ) ( ) lim ( ) for some converging sequence( ) m
m
mn
NN w ww
F w p p P w  

      
If there is a single zero-weight player, the limit distribution is uniquely defined: he or she is 
last with probability 1 and pays his or her marginal cost with respect to the grand coalition 
( ) ( \ ). C N C N i   In Example 1, the value corresponding to the weights (0, 1, 2) is given by 
(1, 5.67, 9.33). Only the permutations (2,3,1) and (3,2,1) enter into account, with probabilities 
1/3 and 2/3, respectively.  
If instead there are several zero-weight players, the limit distribution depends on the speed of 
convergence to zero of the different weights. We shall see that to compute the weighted value 
nonzero-weight players and zero-weight players can be treated separately.   
Theorem 4  The set of weighted values of the cost game (N,C,w) where 
n w    consists of 
the allocations y defined by:  
\\
( , )
\ : ( \ , , ) where { | 0}
: ( ) ( , ) for some (0)
Z
i i N Z N Z i
i i Z
i N Z y N Z C w Z i N w
i Z y t N C F



  
 

    
    
   
independently of  \ . NZ   
Proof   From (5) or (10) it is clear that distributions in F(w) assign a zero probability to 
permutations in which a zero-weight player precedes a nonzero-weight player. Hence, only 
permutations of the form  ( , )        where  \ and N Z Z       may be given a positive 
probability.  By  continuity  of  (10),  for  any  sequence  ( )in
mn w   converging to  w,  the 
sequence of probability distributions () m w P  converges to a distribution p  F(w) of the form 
 
\ \ ( , ) ( ) ( ) for all ( , )
0  otherwise
NZ w N Z Z pP                

 
for some probability distribution  (0). Z F   The corresponding allocation is then given by:  
 
\
\
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , )
NZ
NZ
Z
i w i y P t N C



  
 


     
where 
( , )
i t
    is independent of  for all  \ i N Z   and independent of for all i  Z. Hence, 
for a player  \, i N Z   we have:   
 
\\
\\
( , )
\ ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( \ , )
N Z N Z
N Z Z N Z
i w i w i N Z y P t N C P t N Z C
  
  
   
  
     
          15 
i.e.  \\ ( \ , , )for all \ . i i N Z N Z y N Z C w i N Z    For a player  , iZ   we have:  
 
\
\
( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , )
NZ
Z N Z Z
i i w i y t N C P t N C
   
  
    
   
     
        
This concludes the proof.   
As a consequence, computing the weighted value involves only the coalitions that are either 
subsets of  \ NZ or of the form  \ for some : N Z T T Z   only coalitions of nonzero weight 
players or coalition containing all nonzero weight players matter. The contributions of the 
zero-weight players can then be written as 
  ( ) ( , ')
Z
ii y t Z C




    (11) 
where the marginal contributions vectors  ( , ') t Z C
  are based on the game ( , ') ZC  defined by 
  ( ) ( \ ) ( \ ) C S C S N Z C N Z      
Actually  any probability distribution on  Z   is  possible:  (0) ( ). ZZ F      In  line  with the 
principle  "equal  treatment  of  equals",  the  natural  selection  consists  to  treat  zero-weight 
players  symmetrically  by  using  the  uniform  distribution  ( ) 1 ! for all . Z z        It 
corresponds  to  common  sequences  0 for all .
nn
i w v i Z      The  contributions  of  zero-
weight players are then given by the (symmetric) value associated to the game ( , ): ZC   
 
1
( , , ) ( , ')
!
Z
ii N C w t Z C
z




   
Using the data of Example 3 with  (1,2,0,0), w  we get  ( , , ) (6.33,8.66,8,7). NCw   
4. Concluding remarks 
In the framework of surplus sharing games, weights define the shares in the cake to be divided 
in a pure bargaining game and, when normalized, they are the probabilities of being last in an 
arbitrary  permutation.  Owen  (1968,  1972)  has  shown  that  the  relation  between  what  the 
weighted value assigns to a player and his or her weight may not be monotonic.
17 It is on that 
basis that he questioned the interpretation of weights  as a measure of bargaining ability, an 
interpretation originally suggested by Shapley. In the present cost allocation context, the 
weights define the shares in a fixed cost. Given that the cost function and the weights are 
independent elements, it is no su rprise that what a player is asked to pay may not be 
increasing in his or her weight. Actually Monderer, Samet and Shapley (1992) have shown 
                                                 
17 See also Haeringer (2006).    16 
that monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for concavity. This is illustrated by 
airport games.  
As a last remark, it must be stressed that the axiomatizations that are formulated here apply to 
the case where weights are positive: they do not cover Theorem 4 and its symmetric extension 
(11). It remains an open question.  
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